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Recent theories suggest that reward-based choice
reflects competition between value signals in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). We tested
this idea by recording vmPFC neurons while
macaques performed a gambling task with asyn-
chronous offer presentation. We found that neuronal
activity shows four patterns consistent with selection
via mutual inhibition: (1) correlated tuning for proba-
bility and reward size, suggesting that vmPFC carries
an integrated value signal; (2) anti-correlated tuning
curves for the two options, suggesting mutual inhibi-
tion; (3) neurons rapidly come to signal the value of
the chosen offer, suggesting the circuit serves to
produce a choice; and (4) after regressing out the
effects of option values, firing rates still could predict
choice—a choice probability signal. In addition, neu-
rons signaled gamble outcomes, suggesting that
vmPFC contributes to both monitoring and choice
processes. These data suggest a possible mecha-
nism for reward-based choice and endorse the cen-
trality of vmPFC in that process.
INTRODUCTION
In reward-based (i.e., economic) choice, decision makers select
options based on the values of the outcomes they yield (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011; Rangel et al., 2008). Elucidating the mecha-
nisms of reward-based choice is a fundamental problem in
economics, psychology, cognitive science, and evolutionary
biology (Glimcher, 2003; Rangel et al., 2008; Rushworth et al.,
2011). Recent scholarship suggests that reward value compar-
isons can be efficiently implemented by mutual inhibition be-
tween representations of the values of the options (Hunt et al.,
2012, 2013; Jocham et al., 2012). This mutual inhibition hypoth-
esis is analogous to one closely associated with memory-
guided perceptual comparisons (Hussar and Pasternak, 2012;
Machens et al., 2005; Romo et al., 2002; Wang, 2008). This
theory is also supported by neuroimaging results consistent
with its general predictions (Basten et al., 2010; Boorman
et al., 2009; FitzGerald et al., 2009). However, support is greatly
limited by the lack of single-unit evidence for what is ultimately a
neuronal hypothesis.We chose to record in area 14 of the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), a central region of the monkey ventromedial
reward network that is analogous to human vmPFC (Ongu¨r and
Price, 2000). We chose vmPFC for five reasons. First, a large
number of neuroimaging and lesion studies have identified the
vmPFC as the most likely locus for reward value comparison
(Levy andGlimcher, 2012; Rangel and Clithero, 2012; Rushworth
et al., 2011). Second, lesions to vmPFC are associated with def-
icits in choices between similarly valued items, possibly leading
to inconsistent choices and shifts in choice strategy (Camille
et al., 2011; Fellows, 2006; Noonan et al., 2010; Walton et al.,
2010). Third, activity in this area correlates with the difference be-
tween offered values, suggesting that it may implement a value
comparison process (Boorman et al., 2013; FitzGerald et al.,
2009; Philiastides et al., 2010). Some recent neuroimaging
specifically suggests that vmPFC is the site of a competitive in-
hibition process that implements reward-based choice. Blood
oxygen levels in vmPFC track the relative value between the
chosen option and the next-best alternative (Boorman et al.,
2009, 2013). Fourth, the vmPFC BOLD signal shifts from
signaling value to signaling value difference in a manner consis-
tent with competitive inhibition (Hunt et al., 2012). Fifth, relative
GABAergic and glutamatergic concentrations—chemical signa-
tures of inhibition/excitation balance—in vmPFC are correlated
with choice accuracy (Jocham et al., 2012).
Some previous studies have identified correlates of choice
processes in a closely related (and adjacent) structure, the lateral
orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) (Padoa-Schioppa, 2009, 2013;
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). A key prediction of choice
models is that representations of value in lOFC are stored in a
common currency format and compared locally within lOFC
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). We chose to record in the vmPFC
rather than the lOFC because some evidence suggests the func-
tion of lOFC may be more aptly characterized as credit assign-
ment, salience, reward history, or flexible control of choice
(Feierstein et al., 2006; Hosokawa et al., 2013; Kennerley et al.,
2011; Noonan et al., 2010; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010; Ogawa
et al., 2013; Roesch et al., 2006; Schoenbaum et al., 2009; Wal-
ton et al., 2010; Watson and Platt, 2012; Wilson et al., 2014).
We used a modified version of a two-option risky choice task
we have used in the past (Hayden et al., 2010, 2011a). To tempo-
rally dissociate offered value signals from comparison and
selection signals, we presented each of the two offers asynchro-
nously before allowing overt choice. We found that four patterns
that are consistent with the idea that vmPFC contributes to
choice through mutual inhibition of value representations: (1) in
response to the presentation of the first offer, neurons carriedNeuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1357
Figure 1. Task and Recording Location
(A) Timeline of gambling task. Two options were
presented, each offering a gamble for water
reward. Each gamble was represented by a rect-
angle, some proportion of whichwas gray, blue, or
green, signifying a small, medium, or large reward,
respectively. The size of this colored region indi-
cated theprobability that choosing that offerwould
yield the corresponding reward. Offers appeared
in sequence, offset by 1 s and in a randomorder for
400 ms each. Then, after fixation, both offers re-
appeared during a decision phase. Outcomes that
yielded rewardwere accompanied by a visual cue:
a white circle in the center of the chosen offer.
(B) Example offers. Probabilities for blue and
green offers were drawn from a uniform distribu-
tion between 0% and 100% by 1% increments.
Gray (safe) offers were always associated with a
100% chance for reward.
(C) Magnetic resonance image of monkey B.
Recordings were made in area 14 of vmPFC
(highlighted in green).
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Comparison in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortexa signal that correlated with both its reward probability and
reward size; these signals were positively correlated. This sug-
gests that vmPFC neurons carry integrated value representa-
tions. (2) After presentation of the second offer, but before
choice, neural responses were correlated with values of both
options, but with anti-correlated tuning for the two options, sug-
gesting the two values serve to mutually inhibit neuronal re-
sponding. (3) Neurons rapidly came to signal the value of the
chosen offer but not the unchosen one, suggesting that the pro-
cesses we are observing generate a choice. (4) After accounting
for option values, variability in firing rates after presentation of the
offers predicted choices. This fourth finding is analogous to the
idea of choice probability in perceptual decisionmaking and pro-
vides a strong link between neural activity in vmPFC and control
of choices (Britten et al., 1996; Nienborg and Cumming, 2009).
Collectively, these patterns are consistent with the idea that
vmPFC stores values and compares them through a mutual inhi-
bition process (Hunt et al., 2012; Jocham et al., 2012; Machens
et al., 2005; Wang, 2008).
Wemade an additional observation that fleshes out our under-
standing of the mechanisms of reward value comparison in
vmPFC. We found that vmPFC neurons tracked gamble out-
comes; these monitoring signals were even stronger than
choice-related signals. Unlike similar signals observed in the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and dorsal anterior cortex
(dACC), these responses did not predict strategic adjustments
(Hayden et al., 2008, 2011a). We infer that monitoring functions
of vmPFC are subject to downstream gating before influencing
behavior (cf. Blanchard and Hayden, 2014).
RESULTS
Preferences Patterns for Risky Gambles
Two monkeys performed a two-option gambling task (see
Experimental Procedures; Figures 1A and 1B). Options differed
on two dimensions: probability (0%–100% by 0.1% increments)
and reward size (either medium, 165 ml, or large, 240 ml) (see
Experimental Procedures). On 12.5% of trials, one option was1358 Neuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.a small safe choice (100% chance of 125 ml). Subjects chose
the offer with the higher expected value 85% of the time, sug-
gesting that they generally understood the task and sought to
maximize reward (n = 70,350 trials for all preference pattern
analyses).
Both monkeys were risk seeking, meaning that they preferred
risky to safe offers with matched expected values (Figure 2A).
We quantified risk preferences by computing points of subjective
equivalence (PSE) between safe offers and gambles (Hayden
et al., 2007). The PSE for large reward (green) gambles (0.39 of
the value of the safe offer) was lower than formedium (blue) gam-
bles (0.52). This difference, and also the fact that both large- and
medium-reward PSEs were lower than 1, indicates strong risk-
seeking tendencies (cf. McCoy and Platt, 2005). This risk-
seeking pattern is consistent with what we and others have
observed in rhesus monkeys (Hayden et al., 2011a; Heilbronner
and Hayden, 2013; Monosov and Hikosaka, 2013; O’Neill and
Schultz, 2010; Seo and Lee, 2009; So and Stuphorn, 2012) and
is inconsistent with one recent study showing risk aversion in
rhesus monkeys (Yamada et al., 2013).
To delineate the factors that influence monkeys’ choices, we
implemented a logistic general linear model with choice (offer 1
versus offer 2) as a function of seven regressors: both reward
sizes, both reward probabilities, outcome of previous trial
(reward versus no reward), choice of previous trial (offer 1 versus
offer 2), and side of offer 1 (left versus right). Choice was signif-
icantly affected by both reward sizes (offer 1: t = 115.89; offer 2:
t = 114.77; p < 0.0001 in both cases) and both probabilities
(offer 1 probability: t = 107.31; offer 2 probability: t = 109.65;
p < 0.0001 in both cases) (Figure 2B). Choice was not affected
by outcome of previous trial (t = 0.73, p = 0.47), by chosen offer
order on previous trial (t = 1.37, p = 0.17), or by side of offer 1 (t =
1.60, p = 0.11). Moreover, previous outcomes did not affect
choice coded by side (left offer versus right offer; X2 = 1.17,
p = 0.28), same order offer as previous trial (X2 = 1.03, p =
0.31), same side offer as previous trial (X2 = 0.91, p = 0.34), or
previous offer expected value (high versus low; X2 = 1.70, p =
0.19). The lack of an observed trial-to-trial dependence is
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Likelihood of choosing risky offer instead of
a safe one as a function of risky offer
expected value. Data are separated for high-
value (green) and medium-value (blue) gambles.
Fits are made with a Lowess smoothing func-
tion. Expected values are calculated in units of
ordinal expected value (see Experimental Pro-
cedures).
(B) Effects of seven trial variables on choice
(offer 1 versus 2) using a logistic GLM. Tested
variables are as follows: (1) the reward and
(2) probability for offer 1, the (3) reward and
(4) probability for offer 2, (5) the outcome of
the most recent trial (win or choose safe = 1, loss = 0), (6) the previous choice (first = 1, second = 0), and (7) the order of presentation of offers (left
first = 1, right first = 0). Error bars in all cases are smaller than the border of the bar and are therefore not shown.
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Comparison in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortexinconsistent with an earlier study using a similar task where we
observed a weak trial-to-trial dependence (Hayden et al.,
2011a). We suspect the difference in preferences is due to the
small changes in task design between the earlier studies and
the present one.
Single Unit Responses
We recorded the activity of 156 vmPFC neurons while monkeys
performed our gambling task (106 neurons in monkey B; 50 neu-
rons in monkey H). To maximize our sensitivity to potentially
weak neuronal signals, we deliberately recorded large numbers
of trials for each cell (mean of 1,036 trials per neuron; minimum
of 500 trials). Neurons were localized to area 14 (for precise
demarcation, see Figure S1 available online). For purposes of
analysis, we defined three task epochs. Epochs 1, 2, and 3
began with the presentation of offer 1, the presentation of offer
2, and the reward, respectively, and each lasted 500 ms. We
found that 46.15% of neurons (n = 72/156) showed some sensi-
tivity to task events, as indicated by individual cell ANOVAs of
firing rate against epoch for the three task epochs and a
500ms intertrial epoch (p < 0.0001, binomial test). All proportions
presented below refer to all neurons, not just the ones that pro-
duced a significant response modulation.
Neurons Represent Value in a Common Currency-Like
Format
Monkeys clearly attend to both probability and reward size in
evaluating offers (Figure 2B). We found that the firing rates of a
small but significant number of neurons significantly encoded
reward size (n = 18/156, p < 0.05, linear regression) and proba-
bility (n = 12/156) in epoch 1. These proportions are both greater
than would be expected by chance (binomial test, a = 0.05, p =
0.0003 for reward size and p = 0.025 for probability.) Safe offers,
which occurred on 12.5% of trials, introduce a negative correla-
tion between reward size and probability, so trials with safe
offers are excluded from this analysis. Therefore, reward size
and probability were strictly uncorrelated in the design of the
task.
Do single neurons represent both reward size and probability,
or do neurons specialize for one or the other component variable,
as lOFC neurons appear to (O’Neill and Schultz, 2010; Roesch
et al., 2006)? To address this question, we compared regression
coefficients for firing rate versus probability to coefficients fromthe regression of firing rate versus reward size (in epoch 1). We
found a significant positive correlation between these coeffi-
cients (r = 0.25, p = 0.0023) (Figure 3A). We confirmed that this
correlation is significant using a bootstrap (and thus, nonpara-
metric) correlation test (p = 0.0155; see Experimental Proce-
dures). These effects were even stronger using a 500 ms epoch
beginning 100 ms later, suggesting that value responses in
vmPFC may be sluggish (r = 0.34, p < 0.0001). These data are
consistent with the idea that vmPFC represents value in a com-
mon currency-like format and suggest the possibility that these
values may be compared here as well (Montague and Berns,
2002; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011).
If we assume that neurons represent offer values, defined here
as an offer’s reward size multiplied by its probability, we can
assess the frequency of tuning for offer value in our sample.
We find that responses of 10.9% (n = 17/156, p = 0.0009, bino-
mial test) of neurons correlated with the value of offer 1 in
epoch 1. This percentage rose to 16.66% (n = 26/156) using a
500 ms epoch that begins 100 ms later. Of these 26 neurons,
34.62% (n = 9/26) showed positive tuning for offer value in
epoch 1 while the remainder showed negative tuning (this bias
toward negative tuning is significant; binomial test, p < 0.0001).
See Supplemental Information for neuronal response character-
istics separated by offer 1 reward size.
Neurons Code Offer Values Simultaneously and
Antagonistically
Figures 3B and 3C show value-related responses of an example
neuron. Its firing rates signal the value of offer 1 in epoch 1 (r =
0.18, p < 0.0001, linear regression) and in epoch 2, although
the direction is reversed, and the effect is weaker for the second
epoch (r =0.09, p = 0.0025). This neuron also showed tuning for
offer 2 in epoch 2 (r = 0.21, p < 0.0001), meaning it coded both
values simultaneously. Population data are shown in Figure 3D.
In epoch 2, 10.26% of neurons (n = 16/156, this proportion is sig-
nificant by a binomial test p = 0.0022,) encoded offer value 1 and
15.38% of neurons (n = 24/156, p < 0.0001) encoded offer
value 2. The number of neurons signaling offer value 2 rose to
16.03% (n = 25/156, p < 0.0001. binomial test) 100 ms later.
The observation that tuning direction for offer values 1 and 2
are anticorrelated in our example neuron suggests that these
values interact competitively to influence its firing when informa-
tion about both options is available (Figure 4A). At the populationNeuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1359
Figure 3. Coding of Offer Values in vmPFC
Neurons
(A) Scatter plot of coefficients for tuning for
probability (x axis) and reward size (y axis).
Coefficients are significantly correlated, suggest-
ing a common currency coding scheme. Each
point corresponds to one neuron in our sample.
Data are shown with a least-squares regression
line and confidence intervals in red.
(B) Average responses (±1 SE in firing rate) of an
example neuron to task events, separated by
binned expected value of offer 1. This neuron
showed tuning for offer value 1 during epoch 1
(shaded region).
(C) Responses of the same neuron (±1 SE in firing
rate) separated by binned expected value of
offer 2. The neuron showed tuning for offer value 2
during epoch 2 (shaded region).
(D) Plot of proportion of neurons (%) with re-
sponses significantly tuned to offer value 1 (blue)
and offer value 2 (red) with a 500 ms sliding
boxcar. Horizontal line indicates 5%; significance
bar at alpha = 0.05.
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Comparison in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortexlevel, regression coefficients for offer value 1 in epoch 2 are anti-
correlated with coefficients for offer value 2 in the same epoch
(r =0.218, p = 0.006) (Figure 4B).We confirmed the significance
of this correlation using a bootstrap correlation test (p = 0.0061;
see Experimental Procedures). Tomatch the criteria used above,
these analyses do not include trials with safe options; however, if
we repeat the analysis but include the safe offer trials as well, we
still find an anticorrelation (r = 0.162, p = 0.044).
We have shown that neurons encode the value of offer 1 in
epochs 1 and 2. But does vmPFC use a similar format to repre-
sent offers 1 and 2 as they initially appear, or does it use opposed
ones?Our results support the former idea.We found a significant
positive correlation between the regression coefficients for
offer 1 in epoch 1 and those for offer 2 in epoch 2 (r = 0.453,
p < 0.0001) (see Figure 4C). We confirmed the significance of
this correlation using a bootstrap correlation test (p < 0.0001;
see Experimental Procedures). Thus, whatever effect a larger
offer 1 had on firing rates during epoch 1 in each neuron—
whether excitatory or suppressive—the same effect was
observed for those neurons to a larger offer 2 in epoch 2. This
indicates that vmPFC neurons code the currently offered option
in a common framework (cf. Lim et al., 2011).
Neurons Signal Chosen Offer Value, Not Unchosen Offer
Value
Neurons in vmPFC represent the values of both offers simulta-
neously, but do they participate in selecting a preferred one? If
they participate in choice, we may expect to see the gradual for-
mation of a representation of the value of the chosen option and
the dissolution of the value of the unchosen one. Figure 4D
shows the proportion of neurons whose activity is significantly
modulated by chosen offer values (blue) and by unchosen offer
values (red). (Note that this figure shows a peak during epoch
3 that is even larger than the peak in epoch 2; this is because
the value of the chosen offer was highly correlated with the value1360 Neuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.of the outcome, and outcome coding was stronger than other
effects; see below.)
We found weak coding for the value of the chosen option even
during epoch 1 (7.69% of cells, n = 12/156, binomial test; this
proportion just barely achieves statistical significance, p =
0.05). This activity is not ‘‘precognitive’’ because monkeys can
sometimes guess their chosen option if the first offer is good
enough. We found coding of chosen value during the first
200 ms of the presentation of offer 2 (11.54% of cells, n = 18/
156, p = 0.0003). We used this short epoch (200 ms instead of
the 500 ms we used in other analyses) because it allows us to
more closely inspect the time course of this signal. By a
200 ms epoch 200 ms later into the second epoch, chosen value
coding was observed in 17.31% of cells (n = 27/156, p < 0.0001).
In contrast, 7.69% of cells encoded the value of the unchosen
offer during the first epoch (binomial test; again, this proportion
is right at the significance threshold, p = 0.05), and only 6.4%
(n = 10/156) of neurons encoded unchosen values at the begin-
ning of the second epoch and 200 ms into it (not significant,
p = 0.159). These results indicate that neurons in vmPFC prefer-
entially encode the value of the chosen offer—and do so rapidly
once both offers appear.
Variability in Firing Rates Predicts Choice
To explore the connection between neural activity in vmPFC and
offer selection, we made a calculation similar to choice probabil-
ity (Britten et al., 1996). For each neuron, we regressed firing rate
in epoch 1 onto offer value, probability, and reward size. We then
examined whether the sign of the residuals from this regression
predicted choice (offer 1 versus offer 2) for each neuron. This
analysis provides a measure of residual variance in firing rate
after accounting for the three factors that influence value. We
found a significant correlation between residual firing rate vari-
ance and choice in 11.53% (n = 18/156, p = 0.0003, binomial
test) of cells, which is more than is expected by chance.
Figure 4. vmPFCNeuron Activity Related to
Comparison and Choice
(A) Average responses of example neuron (±1 SE
in firing rate) separated by binned expected
value difference between offer values (offer value
1 minus offer value 2). During epoch 2, this neuron
showed higher firing rates when offer value 2 was
greater than offer value 1 (red) and lower firing
when offer value 1 was greater than offer value 2
(blue).
(B) Scatter plot of coefficients for tuning for
offer value 1 during epoch 2 (x axis) and for offer
value 2 during epoch 2 (y axis). Least-squares
regression line and confidence intervals are
shown in red.
(C) Scatter plot of coefficients for tuning for
offer value 1 during epoch 1 (x axis) and for offer
value 2 during epoch 2 (y axis). Least-squares
regression line and confidence intervals are
shown in red.
(D) Plot of proportion of neurons that show a sig-
nificant correlation between neural activity and
the value of the chosen (blue) and unchosen (red)
offers (500 ms sliding boxcar).
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Comparison in Ventromedial Prefrontal CortexSimilarly, residual variation in firing rate in response to offer
value 2 during epoch 2 predicted choice in 12.18% of cells
(n = 19/156, p = 0.0001, binomial test). This link between firing
rates and choice is consistent with the fourth key prediction of
the competitive inhibition hypothesis.
Neurons in vmPFC Strongly Encode Outcome Values
Outcome-monitoring signals were particularly strong during our
task. Figure 5A shows responses of an example neuron with
trials separated by gamble outcome. This neuron signaled
received reward size in epoch 3 (r = 0.11, p = 0.0047, linear
regression). We observed a significant relationship between
firing rate and gamble outcome in 18.59% of cells (n = 29/156;
p < 0.0001, binomial test) (Figure 5B). In an epoch beginning
400 ms later, this proportion rose to 25% of cells (n = 39/156;
p < 0.0001). Of these cells, 56.41% (n = 22/39) showed negative
tuning (no significant bias, p = 0.55, binomial test). Interestingly,
outcome coding persisted across the delay between trials.
Specifically, previous trial outcome was a major influence on
firing rates during both epochs 1 (14.74% of cells, n = 23/156,
p < 0.0001, binomial test) and 2 (16.03% of cells, n = 25/156,
p < 0.0001) (Figure 5C).
Is the vmPFC coding format for outcome related to its coding
format for offer values? We next compared tuning profiles for
outcome and offer value 1 (we found that coding in epochs 1
and 2 is shared; see above). Specifically, we asked whether, in
our population of cells, regression coefficients for offer value 1
in epoch 1 are correlatedwith regression coefficients for received
rewardsize inepoch3.We foundasignificant correlationbetween
regression coefficients for offer value 1 in epoch 1 and regression
coefficients for received reward size in epoch 3 (r = 0.22, p =
0.0054). This suggests that vmPFC neurons use a single coding
scheme to represent offer values and represent outcomes.
Do vmPFC neurons signal outcomes or the difference be-
tween expected outcome and received outcome? To investigatethis issue, we performed a stepwise regression to determine
whether postoutcome responses in vmPFC are related to reward
size (first) and to the probability of that reward (second). Specif-
ically, we performed a stepwise regression on average neural
firing rates in epoch 3 onto gamble outcome and the probability
that the chosen option would yield a reward. To deal with the
problem that many neurons have negative tuning, we flipped
the values for neurons that had negative individual tuning
profiles.
We first examined all risky trials together (medium reward size,
blue/red bars, and high reward size, green/red bars). With these
trials, gamble outcome regressor met the criteria for model inclu-
sion (b = 0.1058, p < 0.0001), but the reward probability of the
chosen option did not (b = 0.0034, p = 0.8077). We then
repeated these analyses for the medium- and high-reward size
trials together, in case there was an interaction with reward
size. We find similar results when examining only trials where a
blue option was chosen (gamble outcome: b = 0.1224, p <
0.0001; chosen option reward probability: b = 0.0188, p =
0.4093) and when examining only trials where a green option
was chosen (gamble outcome: b = 0.1211, p < 0.0001; chosen
option reward probability: b = 0.0244, p = 0.1602). This indicates
that vmPFC neurons signal pure outcome, not the deviation of
outcomes from expectation.
DISCUSSION
We recorded responses of neurons in area 14 of vmPFC while
rhesus monkeys performed a gambling task with staggered pre-
sentation of offers. We observed four major effects. First, neu-
rons carried an abstract value signal that depended on both
probability and reward size. Second, when information about
both options was available, responses were antagonistically
modulated by values of the two options. Third, neurons rapidly
came to signal the value of the chosen offer but not the unchosenNeuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1361
Figure 5. Coding of Outcomes in vmPFC
Neurons
(A) Average responses (±1 SE in firing rate) of an
example neuron to task events separated by
outcome. This neuron showed a positive tuning
for outcome during epoch 3 (shaded area).
(B) Plot of proportion of neurons significantly
tuned for outcomes as a function of time in task
using a 500 ms sliding window.
(C) Same data as in (B), but sorted for outcome on
previous trial instead of on current trial. Influence
of outcome on previous trial was strong and lasted
throughout the current trial.
Neuron
Comparison in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortexone. Fourth, after accounting for option values, residual vari-
ability in firing rates around the time of choice predicted choice.
While we do not show directly that vmPFC neurons engage in
mutual inhibition, these results are consistent with the theory
that value comparison reflects a competition for control of
vmPFC responses through mutual inhibition (Cisek, 2012; Hunt
et al., 2012; Jocham et al., 2012; Wang, 2008).
Although reward correlates are observed in many brain
areas, we suspect that vmPFC may be specialized for reward
value comparisons. A great deal of neuroimaging evidence
supports this hypothesis (Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Rushworth
et al., 2011). The lOFC does not appear to integrate different
dimensions of risky choices into a single value, suggesting
that it may be predecisional. Moreover, value-coding neurons
there do not show choice probability correlates, suggesting
they may be only peripherally involved in choice (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2013). Finally, human and monkey lesions in lOFC
do not produce choice deficits but learning deficits. Indeed,
recent comprehensive theories of lOFC function suggest that
it carries multiple different values useful for controlling
choice but does not itself implement choice (Rushworth et al.,
2011; Wilson et al., 2014). In a similar vein, while the anterior
cingulate cortex codes reward values, its signals appear to
be postdecisional (Blanchard and Hayden, 2014; Cai and
Padoa-Schioppa, 2012). These findings are consistent with
the idea that dACC is a controller but not a decider (Shenhav
et al., 2013). Finally, the lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) is asso-
ciated with choice processes, but it does not appear to repre-
sent values (Leathers and Olson, 2012) and does not show
value comparison signals (Louie et al., 2011). These results
suggest that choice occurs elsewhere; neuroimaging and
anatomical evidence suggest that vmPFC is the site; our results
endorse this idea.1362 Neuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.Nonetheless, these results do not sug-
gest that vmPFC is the only area in which
value comparison occurs. Value compar-
ison may, in some circumstances, occur
in the lOFC, the ventral striatum (Cai
et al., 2011), and the premotor cortex
(Hunt et al., 2013). Indeed, it is not certain
that value comparison occurs exclusively
in one region instead of multiple regions
acting in parallel (Cisek, 2012). However,
in any of these cases, our results providedirect evidence for a specific mechanism by which value com-
parison occurs.
One limitation of the present study is that monkeys were over-
trained on the task, which may change choice behavior or how
reward information is represented in the brain. This is a limitation
of all single-unit behavioral studies in monkeys. It is possible that
large-scale recording grids combined with innovative recording
techniques might help with this problem in the future.
Four recent reports describe response properties of vmPFC
neurons. Bouret and Richmond (2010) demonstrated that neu-
rons in area 14 preferentially encode internal sources of reward
information, such as satiety, over external sources of reward in-
formation, such as visually offered reward or gamble offers.
While we did not compare vmPFC to lOFC as they did, our re-
sults demonstrate that strong and significant external value
and comparison signals can be readily observed in area 14
with a sufficiently demanding task. Monosov and Hikosaka
(2012) showed that in a Pavlovian task, separate populations
of area 14 neurons preferentially encode reward size and proba-
bility. Our recordings suggest that at least some neurons in area
14 can integrate probability and reward size into a combined
signal. One possible explanation for the difference in the two
sets of findings is that, unlike Monosov and Hikosaka, we used
a choice task, which demands active consideration of both
aspects of reward. Watson and Platt (2012) found that social in-
formation is prioritized in vmPFC (and in lOFC), even relative to its
influence on preferences. In combination with our findings, these
results suggest that social influences may be treated as qualita-
tively different than other factors that influence value (but see
Smith et al., 2010). Rich and Wallis (2014) found generally
weak and inconsistent responses in area 14 (which they call
mOFC), suggesting that their task, which did not require value
comparison, did not strongly selectively drive these neurons.
Neuron
Comparison in Ventromedial Prefrontal CortexRelative to our recordings in a similar task in another medial
prefrontal structure, dACC, we find that neuronal responses in
vmPFC are weaker and have less consistent tuning directions
(Hayden and Platt, 2010). This difference may reflect that we
havenot yet identified the ideal driving stimuli for vmPFC.Another
possibility is a bias in recorded cell types. Unlike dACC, vmPFC
lacksaprominent layer 5 (Vogt, 2009),whichmeans that our sam-
ple of neuronsmay contain fewer output cells andmore interneu-
rons (Hayden et al., 2011a, 2011b). These responses may also
simply be representative of vmPFC. The vmPFC responses we
report here are generally small and long lasting, making them
reminiscent of those observed in PCC (Hayden et al., 2008,
2009; Heilbronner et al., 2011). Intriguingly, PCC shows strong
anatomical and functional connections with vmPFC (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Vogt and Pandya, 1987) and, like it, is part
of thepoorly understooddefaultmodenetwork (Raichle andGus-
nard, 2005). Integrating our understanding of default mode func-
tion with choice is an important goal for future studies.
Finally, we were surprised that the largest and most robust re-
sponses in vmPFC were outcome monitoring signals. Outcome
monitoring signals are common in both ACC and PCC, and in
these areas, they predict adjustments in behavior that follow
specific outcomes (Hayden et al., 2008, 2011a). In contrast,
the outcome signals we observed in vmPFC did not predict
changes in behavior. This lack of an effect suggests that value
monitoring signals in vmPFC may be somewhat automatic
(that is, not contingent on the outcome having a specific effect)
and are subject to a downstream gating process (that is, they
do not affect behavior directly). Thus, these signals may be
considered monitoring signals while those in cingulate may be
more helpfully classified as control signals. Given the anatomy,
we suspect that vmPFC may be one input for the control signals
generated by cingulate cortex. Interestingly, a recent report sug-
gests that monitoring signals that do not affect behavior are also
observed on the dorsolateral surface of the prefrontal cortex
(Genovesio et al., 2014).
In contrast to perceptual decision making, very little work has
looked at the mechanisms of reward-based decisions. Kacelnik
and colleagues (2011) have investigated this problem and have
specifically compared two hypotheses: (1) the tug-of-war hy-
pothesis, in which there is a mutual inhibition between value rep-
resentations, and (2) the race-to-threshold hypothesis, in which
value representations compete, noninteractively, and the first
one to achieve some threshold is chosen. While Kacelnik’s
work provides strong support for the race-to-threshold model,
ours would seem to support the tug-of-war hypothesis. In
particular, the finding that vmPFC neurons gradually come to
represent the value of the chosen option at the expense of the
unchosen would appear difficult to reconcile with a pure race-
to-threshold model. Instead, our finding of value difference sig-
nals is consistent with a version of the race-to-threshold model
that involves competition between racing value representations.
Nonetheless, these results do not endorse a single model of
reward-based choice. Unfortunately, by presenting options
asynchronously, we were unable to measure reaction times in
our task, meaning a direct comparison is impossible. It seems
that further work will be needed to more fully compare these
two hypotheses.One of the most interesting aspects of these postreward sig-
nals is that vmPFC appeared to use a similar coding framework
to encode outcomes and offers. One speculative explanation for
this finding is that offer signals are essentially reactivations of
reward representations (Kahnt et al., 2011). Monkeys might
consider offers by predicting the activation they would generate
if they received that reward. If so, then choice may work through
competition betweenmental simulations of outcomes. While this
hypothesis is speculative, it is at least tenuously supported by
the existence of direct anatomical projections to vmPFC from
hippocampus and amygdala, structures associated with asso-
ciative learning (Carmichael and Price, 1995), and by evidence
of co-occurring outcome and value signals throughout the
medial frontal lobe (Luk and Wallis, 2009). Future studies will
be needed to more fully test this hypothesis.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Surgical Procedures
All animal procedures were approved by the University Committee on Animal
Resources at the University of Rochester and were designed and conducted in
compliance with the Public Health Service’s Guide for the Care and Use of
Animals. Two male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) served as subjects.
A small prosthesis for holding the head was used. Animals were habituated
to laboratory conditions and then trained to perform oculomotor tasks for
liquid reward. A Cilux recording chamber (Crist Instruments) was placed
over the vmPFC. Position was verified by magnetic resonance imaging with
the aid of a Brainsight system (Rogue Research Inc.). Animals received appro-
priate analgesics and antibiotics after all procedures. Throughout both behav-
ioral and physiological recording sessions, the chamber was kept sterile with
regular antibiotic washes and sealed with sterile caps.
Recording Site
We approached vmPFC through a standard recording grid (Crist Instruments).
We defined vmPFC as the coronal planes situated between 29 and 44 mm
rostral to the interaural plane, the horizontal planes situated between 0 and
9 mm from the ventral surface of vmPFC, and the sagittal planes between
0 and 8mm from themedial wall (Figures 1C and S1). These coordinates corre-
spond to area 14 (Ongu¨r and Price, 2000). Our recordings were made from a
central region within this zone. We confirmed recording location before each
recording session using our Brainsight system with structural magnetic reso-
nance images taken before the experiment. Neuroimaging was performed at
the Rochester Center for Brain Imaging, on a Siemens 3T MAGNETOM Trio
Tim using 0.5 mm voxels. We confirmed recording locations by listening for
characteristic sounds of white and gray matter during recording, which in
all cases matched the loci indicated by the Brainsight system with an error
of <1 mm in the horizontal plane and <2 mm in the z direction.
Electrophysiological Techniques
Single electrodes (Frederick Haer & Co., impedance range 0.8 to 4 MU) were
lowered using amicrodrive (NAN Instruments) until waveforms of between one
and three neuron(s) were isolated. Individual action potentials were isolated on
a Plexon system (Plexon). Neurons were selected for study solely on the basis
of the quality of isolation; we never preselected based on task-related
response properties. All collected neurons for which we managed to obtain
at least 500 trials were analyzed; no neurons that surpassed our isolation
criteria were excluded from analysis.
Eye Tracking and Reward Delivery
Eye position was sampled at 1,000 Hz by an infrared eye-monitoring camera
system (SR Research). Stimuli were controlled by a computer running Matlab
(Mathworks) with Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) and Eyelink Toolbox (Corne-
lissen et al., 2002). Visual stimuli were colored rectangles on a computer
monitor placed 57 cm from the animal and centered on its eyes (Figure 1A).Neuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1363
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Comparison in Ventromedial Prefrontal CortexA standard solenoid valve controlled the duration of juice delivery. The relation-
ship between solenoid open time and juice volume was established and
confirmed before, during, and after recording.
Behavioral Task
Monkeys performed a two-option gambling task (Figures 1A and 1B). The task
was similar to one we have used previously (Hayden et al., 2010, 2011a) with
two major differences: (1) offers were presented asynchronously, and (2) two
different winning reward sizes (medium and large) offers were available,
depending on the gamble.
Two offers were presented on each trial. Each offer was represented by a
rectangle 300 pixels tall and 80 pixels wide (11.35 of visual angle tall and
4.08 of visual angle wide). Options offered either a gamble or a safe (100%
probability) bet for liquid reward. Gamble offers were defined by two parame-
ters, reward size and probability. Each gamble rectangle was divided into two
portions, one red and the other either blue or green. The size of the blue or
green portions signified the probability of winning a medium (mean 165 ml) or
large reward (mean 240 ml), respectively. These probabilities were drawn
from a uniform distribution between 0% and 100%. The rest of the bar was
colored red; the size of the red portion indicated the probability of no reward.
Safe offers were entirely gray and always carried a 100% probability of a small
reward (125 ml).
On each trial, one offer appeared on the left side of the screen and the other
appeared on the right. Offers were separated from the fixation point by 550
pixels (27.53 of visual angle). The side of the first and second offer (left and
right) were randomized by trial. Each offer appeared for 400 ms and was fol-
lowed by a 600 ms blank period. Monkeys were free to fixate upon the offers
when they appeared (and in our casual observations almost always did so).
After the offers were presented separately, a central fixation spot appeared
and the monkey fixated on it for 100 ms. Following this, both offers appeared
simultaneously and the animal indicated its choice by shifting gaze to its
preferred offer and maintaining fixation on it for 200 ms. Failure to maintain
gaze for 200 ms did not lead to the end of the trial, but instead returned the
monkey to a choice state; thus, monkeys were free to change their mind if
they did so within 200 ms (although in our observations, they seldom did
so). Following a successful 200 ms fixation, the gamble was immediately
resolved and reward delivered. Trials that took more than 7 s were considered
inattentive trials and were not included in analysis (this removed <1% of trials).
Outcomes that yielded reward were accompanied by a visual cue: a white
circle in the center of the chosen offer (see Figure 1A). All trials were followed
by an 800 ms intertrial interval with a blank screen.
Probabilities were drawn from uniform distributions with a resolution only
limited by the size of the computer screen’s pixels. This let us present
hundreds of unique gambles. Offer types were selected at random with a
43.75% probability of blue gamble, a 43.75% probability of green gambles,
and 12.5% probability of safe offers.
Statistical Methods
PSTHs were constructed by aligning spike rasters to the presentation of
the first offer and averaging firing rates across multiple trials. Firing rates
were calculated in 20 ms bins but were generally analyzed in longer
(500 ms) epochs. For display, PSTHs were smoothed using a 200 ms running
boxcar.
Some statistical tests of neuron activity were only appropriate when applied
to single neurons one at a time because of variations in response properties
across the population. In such cases, a binomial test was used to determine
if a significant portion of single neurons reached significance on their own,
thereby allowing conclusions about the neural population as a whole.
Throughout data collection, reward for gray, blue, and green offers were
associated with a few different sets of reward sizes due in part to the use of
two different juicer solenoids. Despite this, reward sizes maintained the
same sizes relative to each other. To account for overall variations in reward
size, our analyses consistently make use of an ordinal coding of reward size,
with gray, blue, and green offers offering 1, 2, and 3 juice units, respectively.
To test if certain signals tend to occur within the same neurons, we used
the following bootstrap method. For each neuron, we calculated regression
coefficients for those signals. We then calculated the correlation between1364 Neuron 82, 1357–1366, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.those two sets of regression coefficients. We repeated this process 10,000
times using randomly reshuffled firing rates. We used the percentile at which
the original data correlation coefficient fell in this distribution of randomized
correlation coefficients as the p value for a single-tailed test, which we multi-
plied by two to calculate the p value for a two-tailed test. For example, if the
correlation coefficient from the original data was greater than 90% of the
randomized correlation coefficients, we considered the tuning significant at
p = 0.05.
We performed one analysis to investigate how variance in firing related to
variance in preference. First, we determined the best-fit curve for firing rate
in epoch 1 as a function of the expected value of the first offer. In one analysis
we fit to a line; in a second one we fit to the best-fit second-order polynomial.
(We tested third and fourth order polynomials as well and found similar results;
data not reported.) We next classified each trial based on whether the
observed firing rate in epoch 1 was greater or lower than a value predicted
by the best-fit functions. Finally, we correlated choice (coded as 1 or 0, indi-
cating choice of offer 1 or 2) with whether firing rate was higher or lower
than expected, on a trial-by-trial basis. We tested for a significant relation
within each individual neuron using Pearson’s correlation test of these two
sets of variables with trial as the unit of analysis. We then repeated this analysis
for epoch 2.
In this paper we made a deliberate decision to use expected values rather
than subjective values in correlating neural activity with value. The primary
reason for this is that it is the most agnostic approach one can take with regard
to the causes of risk seeking. While it may be standard practice to transform
values into utilities, behavioral economics has demonstrated that utility curve
shape cannot explain risk attitudes in general (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000;
Rabin, 2000). Our research has demonstrated that these arguments apply to
monkeys as well (Hayden et al., 2010; Heilbronner and Hayden, 2013; Strait
and Hayden, 2013). Moreover, using expected values bypasses the troubling
question of what timescale to use to determine value functions, a decision that
can have great consequences on data interpretation (Sugrue et al., 2005).
Fortunately, the question of whether we use expected value or subjective value
is unlikely to have more than amarginal effect on our numbers and no effect on
the qualitative findings we report. This is most directly demonstrated by the
fact that our findings all reproduce if we restrict our analyses to high- and
medium-value gambles alone. Because these gambles have only two out-
comes, utility transformations have no effect. In any case, because the map-
ping function between firing rate and value is nonlinear and quite noisy, the
subtle changes caused by using subjective value are almost certain to produce
effects that are around the level of statistical noise.
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